Ziporyn on the Liji V: Cheng With a Twist

Scott Bradley

The reader might have noticed that these posts about cheng (sincerity, honesty, authenticity) have been more about Mencius' take than that of the Liji; this is because Ziporyn introduces the latter with the former. To this writer, the exploration of the meaning of cheng is profitable irrespective of which philosophy provides us access. In other words, I am more interested in the ideas than I am in their source.

Ziporyn finds in the Liji's sense of cheng "a newly appropriated subjective form of ironic intelligibility as a hiddenness that is indirectly expressed in all actions, and hence omnipresent in that sense." He calls this sense of cheng an "unseen coherence". This is the folding of the ironic Dao of Daoism into the otherwise non-ironic Dao of Confucianism. The question is: How do we make sense of the world (so as to know how to live) when we admit to the ultimate unintelligibility of the world (the ironic Dao)? The “Doctrine of the Mean” and “The Great Learning” of the Liji answer this question by admitting that cheng spontaneously arises out of the nature of humanity and the world and is thus rooted in the "hidden", and not in an articulable analysis of the world which we subsequently follow. In other words, we realize cheng by letting it happen rather than by following some rationalized schema of our understanding of the nature of the world. This is a huge concession on the part of Confucianism, and the antithesis of Xunzi’s approach.

In this, Ziporyn sees the “Doctrine of the Mean” as going beyond Mencius and “The Great Learning” to a cheng with "a metaphysical twist": "Unseen coherence (cheng) means self-completion. Dao means self-guidance. For unseen coherence is the end and the beginning of each thing. Without unseen coherence there is no thing." Cheng spontaneously happens, arising out of that which cannot be articulated. This is the position of philosophical Daoism. But here it is given a moral interpretation. The text continues: "This is why the exemplary person values unseen coherence. . . . Completion of oneself is benevolence; completion of things is wisdom. These are the Virtues [de] of the inborn nature, the Dao of joining the inner and the outer . . ."

Because he gives it a moral meaning (benevolence spontaneously happens), we can say that this "twist" is "metaphysical". Daoism, on the other hand, though it does not dispute this outcome of spontaneity, does not assert it either, or require that it be so; whatever happens is so. In this sense, philosophical Daoism's reliance on spontaneity is non-metaphysical.

You can check out Scott's other miscellaneous writings here.

Ziporyn on the Liji IV: Still More on Cheng

Scott Bradley

The Dao of Heaven is to be cheng; the Dao of man is to become cheng.
(Mencius, A412)

There are instances when Zhuangzi tells us what the ultimate benefits of following his suggested path are, and if we were hoping for Nirvana, or some other brand of 'salvation' or eternal reward, then we would be sorely disappointed. No, the only suggested benefit to facing squarely our human experience and transcending it in acceptance is to fulfill our allotted years. This implies a great deal more than life span, however; it is a qualitative fulfillment as well as a quantitative one. And this fulfillment is, I would suggest, cheng.

Cheng, as we saw previously, is both the highest value and the means to realizing that value. To be fully who we are, to be authentic, is the goal, and the means to achieving it is authenticity. To be fully integrated into our context, both internal and external, is to do the work of integrating. To realize sincerity, realness, is to practice sincerity. To be honest is to practice honesty. Thus, one is cheng not so much in arriving at 'absolute' cheng, but in practicing cheng in the pursuit of cheng. It may be that 'absolute' cheng is unrealizable, but that is of no great consequence, since the essence of cheng is honesty, and honesty can be realized even as an admission of our dishonesty.

As suggested at the close of the previous post, though “becoming cheng” is the fulfillment of one’s potential, this is not intended, at least in the Zhuangzian vision, to imply that there is some preexistent “true nature” to be realized. The only ‘nature’ there is is the one that we actually are, and that is always in the process of becoming, or as Zhuangzi would say, is always part of the endless transformation of things. This is reflected in the existentialist formula that “existence precedes essence”; there is no ideal essential self, no ‘true self’, to be realized, but only the self that we are at any point in time. In this, philosophical Daoism takes an entirely different path than Buddhism where we are invited to realize our “buddha nature”, the implication of which being that not only is there an essential self, but one that is somehow integral to the ultimate nature of Reality. (I realize, of course, that there are many possible rebuttals to this statement, that the ‘buddha nature’ is no-self for instance, but in the end I do not think that any sleight of mind can escape the fundamentally idealistic character of Buddhism — it knows the answer even if it cannot articulate what that answer ultimately is.)

The question arises, as it always does, whether this really matters in any practical sense. I think it does. Zhuangzi’s Consummate Person “wanders” precisely because she has no fixed destination. She has surrendered into the ever-transforming, and this involves no neatly packaged assurances about the way things really are or in which direction they are headed. All there is is this present following along with whatever Happens. Ideal goals, as Zen readily admits, are antithetical to true liberation.

You can check out Scott's other miscellaneous writings here.

Ziporyn on the Liji III: More on Cheng

Scott Bradley

The Dao of Heaven is to be cheng; the Dao of man is to become cheng.
(Mencius, A412)

Cheng is usually translated as "sincere" (or as a noun, "sincerity"). However, Ziporyn suggests as equally valid for the use above "real", "integrated", or in the context of his overall theme, "coherent". I would like to suggest another possibility: "authentic".

Despite the incredible mess that humanity has created in its own little backwater of the Universe, the view from Dao tells us that all is nevertheless well. Dao has its own act together, and since there is really nothing that is not Dao, that means that even humanity has its act together. Yes, that is indeed an assertion hard to get one's mind around, but one that I think is unavoidable from the point of view of philosophical Daoism and absolutely necessary to the actual behaviorial outcomes that Daoism envisions as condusive of the greatest enjoyment of life. Wuwei (non-doing), ziran (spontaneity), and Zhuangzi's free and unfettered wandering are all predicated on this implicit trust in the ultimate 'rightness' of things as they are.

Is this a "belief" (something I usually eschew)? Perhaps; but if so, it is, I would suggest, one that naturally arises out of the life experience, and as such requires no defence. Is it a belief to say that life seeks to live? Perhaps; but that life lives requires no proof. (Just as knowing the happiness of fish is self-evidential and lies beyond proof.)

Cheng, in the case of Reality, is being real, a wonderful tautology, to be sure. In the case of humanity, however, it is to become real. Thus, I have suggested "authenticity" as an appropriate stand in. Authenticity is becoming who we are. Becoming who we are is much more a question of seeing and admitting to who we are than it is changing who we are, though the latter is understood to follow naturally from the former. Thus, cheng is "sincerity", honesty. We can see then how that cheng is a necessary requirement for self-cultivation, especially as that is facilitated by self-examination.

Cheng is also "integration", which is essentially Ziporyn's "coherence". The Dao of Heaven is the way all things fit together. All things fit together; this is so ‘true’ that to say it is to miss it. It could not be otherwise (from the point of view of Daoism). In the case of human subjectivity, therefore, it is similarly the realization of integration with the givens of life and the realities of one’s own unique existential expression. It is fitting in with the way things are, or appear to be (it does not matter which). It is thus first the illumination of one’s context (internal and external) and secondly the affirmation of that which is illuminated.

Cheng also implies the fulfillment of one’s potential. In seeing who we are and affirming who we are, we become more of who we are. What is that? For Daoism, it is certainly not realizing one’s “true nature”, for there is no such thing until one becomes it.

You can check out Scott's other miscellaneous writings here.

Ziporyn on the Liji II: Cheng

Scott Bradley

Despite what might be suggested by the title above, this series will not be an attempt to convey the teaching of the selected documents within the Liji ("The Doctrine of the Mean" and "The Great Learning") or of Ziporyn's take of them; I honestly can't say I that I have sufficiently comprehended either to do so. Rather, my use of them will be anecdotal, as was my use of Xunzi in the previous series.

In his explanation of the role of coherence within these documents, Ziporyn discusses the importance of the term cheng, usually translated as "sincerity", though he suggests that "coherence" might in some cases do just as well, since it entails a uniting of intention with a dao. This is a core value within Confucianism and is understood, I think, as absolutely necessary to a successful course (dao) of self-cultivation. Personally, I see myself as on such a course, and write under the assumption that my readers (should there be any) are similarly so involved. Thus, the nature of cheng may have something of importance to teach us.

"Sincerity" certainly has a great deal to do with the manner in which we engage in self-cultivation, tending toward the nature of our self-examination. However, it also speaks to the overall character of perceived reality generally, and thus our approximating sincerity is a reflection of the sincerity of things as they are. Ziporyn quotes Mencius in this regard: "The Dao of Heaven is to be cheng; the Dao of man is to become cheng." (4A12)

"Sincerity" in the case of reality is to be what it is, which seems fairly unproblematical. As is usually the case with humanity, however, things are more problematical: it is necessary to become sincere, to become what we are. There is a sense in which this is nonsense ("become what we are"?), but then such is the human experience, "a being such that, it is what it is not, and is not what it is", to quote Sartre. Or, as Zhuangzi puts it: our "not-one is also One", which I take to mean that despite our need to become, our not-yet-having-become is in the broadest sense, in the view from Dao, no different than having-become. Whether we have realized sincerity or remain insincere is, in the end, of no great consequence since all things are affirmed just as they are. There is nothing we need become. With this tucked away in our consciousness, we are free to proceed with our becoming without the burden of guilt and judgmentalism, a situation that seems to me at least, suggestive of love — love for oneself and thus for others.

You can check out Scott's other miscellaneous writings here.

The Dao of Poltical Power II: Zhuangzi As Yangist

Scott Bradley

If it were possible to ascertain the actual political philosophy of Zhuangzi, I am not at all sure that I would like it. There are other things he has to say which I don't like, but which I recognize as remedial — I don't like them because they cut against the grain of my "typical human inclinations". Zhuangzi's intention is not to tell us what we want to hear, but what, should we allow it to open us to other possibilities, though initially painful, might ultimately lead us to greater happiness. Thus, I must ask myself if I dislike Zhuangzi's political theory because it does not seem to me to be the 'moral' approach — we do have social responsibilities after all. And that immediately sends up a cautionary flag, for as soon as we start speaking of "the right thing to do" we have moved from freedom into bondage. It is not that the right thing wouldn't in any case be done, but that it would be done still more rightly, that is, more effectively.

The best place to start in coming to grips with Zhuangzi's political theory is to try and understand what it is, but this can only be an approximation — there is sufficient ambiguity and apparent contradiction to make this a tentative exercise.

At the core, he has definite Yangist tendencies. A. C. Graham has speculated that Zhuangzi might very well have at one time even been a Yangist. According to Mencius, Yang Chou would not have sacrificed one hair from his shin to save the world. This is no doubt hyperbole, but provides us significant insight into what he was about. His core belief, it seems, was that one's greatest responsibility is to survive. Zhuangzi seems to agree with this principle.

Yang has been labeled a 'hedonist', though much of the weight for this appellation comes from a spurious work in the Liezi attributed to him. Though even present day scholars continue to label him thus, I think it both unfair and misleading.

It is easy enough to see why Zhuangzi would feel sympathy for this principle. This, above all else, is what life does. Life is an impetus to live. And Zhuangzi's core belief is that we do best when we let life express itself through us. We are enjoined to “not add anything to the process of life.” Sacrificing oneself for some ideal is doing just that. Is this making us uncomfortable, yet? Going against our potty-training, is it? Not what we were taught in Sunday school?

Following this principle one would not “die for his country” or to “keep the world safe for democracy”. We might be able to get our moralizing minds around this, but what of sacrificing ourselves to save our child? There are always hypothetical counter-arguments, because life does not follow principles and rules. But here I think Mencius had it right when he suggests that anyone (normal) would jump to save a child from falling into a well without weighing the pros and cons of such an action. It is spontaneous, and that is the whole point.

You can check out Scott's writings on Zhuangzi here.

Mencius - Book 7, Part 2, Chapter 38

Mencius said, 'From Yâo and Shun down to T'ang were 500 years and more. As to Yu and Kâo Yâo, they saw those earliest sages, and so knew their doctrines, while T'ang heard their doctrines as transmitted, and so knew them.

'From T'ang to king Wan were 500 years and more. As to Î Yin, and Lâi Chû, they saw T'ang and knew his doctrines, while king Wan heard them as transmitted, and so knew them.

'From king Wan to Confucius were 500 years and more. As to T'âi-kung Wang and San Î-shang, they saw Wan, and so knew his doctrines, while Confucius heard them as transmitted, and so knew them.

'From Confucius downwards until now, there are only 100 years and somewhat more. The distance in time from the sage is so far from being remote, and so very near at hand was the sage's residence. In these circumstances, is there no one to transmit his doctrines? Yea, is there no one to do so?'

~ James Legge translation via nothingistic.org ~

 Go here to read the introductory post to this serialized version of the Works of Mencius. This post marks the end of this series.  We hope you enjoyed it!!

Mencius - Book 7, Part 2, Chapter 37C

Wan Chang said, 'Their whole village styles those men good and careful. In all their conduct they are so. How was it that Confucius considered them the thieves of virtue?'

Mencius replied, 'If you would blame them, you find nothing to allege. If you would criticize them, you have nothing to criticize. They agree with the current customs. They consent with an impure age. Their principles have a semblance of right-heartedness and truth. Their conduct has a semblance of disinterestedness and purity. All men are pleased with them, and they think themselves right, so that it is impossible to proceed with them to the principles of Yâo and Shun. On this account they are called "The thieves of virtue."

'Confucius said, "I hate a semblance which is not the reality. I hate the darnel, lest it be confounded with the corn. I hate glib-tonguedness, lest it be confounded with righteousness. I hate sharpness of tongue, lest it be confounded with sincerity. I hate the music of Chang, lest it be confounded with the true music. I hate the reddish blue, lest it be confounded with vermilion. I hate your good careful men of the villages, lest they be confounded with the truly virtuous."

'The superior man seeks simply to bring back the unchanging standard, and, that being correct, the masses are roused to virtue. When they are so aroused, forthwith perversities and glossed wickedness disappear.'

~ James Legge translation via nothingistic.org ~

 Go here to read the introductory post to this serialized version of the Works of Mencius.

Mencius - Book 7, Part 2, Chapter 37B

'Why were they styled "ambitious?"'

The reply was, 'Their aim led them to talk magniloquently, saying, "The ancients!" "The ancients!" But their actions, where we fairly compare them with their words, did not correspond with them.

'When he found also that he could not get such as were thus ambitious, he wanted to get scholars who would consider anything impure as beneath them. Those were the cautiously-decided, a class next to the former.'

Chang pursued his questioning, 'Confucius said, "They are only your good careful people of the villages at whom I feel no indignation, when they pass my door without entering my house. Your good careful people of the villages are the thieves of virtue." What sort of people were they who could be styled "Your good careful people of the villages?"'

Mencius replied, 'They are those who say, "Why are they so magniloquent? Their words have not respect to their actions and their actions have not respect to their words, but they say, "The ancients! The ancients! Why do they act so peculiarly, and are so cold and distant? Born in this age, we should be of this age, to be good is all that is needed." Eunuch-like, flattering their generation; such are your good careful men of the villages.'

~ James Legge translation via nothingistic.org ~

 Go here to read the introductory post to this serialized version of the Works of Mencius.

Mencius - Book 7, Part 2, Chapter 37A

Wan Chang asked, saying, 'Confucius, when he was in Ch'an, said: "Let me return. The scholars of my school are ambitious, but hasty. They are for advancing and seizing their object, but cannot forget their early ways." Why did Confucius, when he was in Ch'an, think of the ambitious scholars of Lû?'

Mencius replied, 'Confucius not getting men pursuing the true medium, to whom he might communicate his instructions, determined to take the ardent and the cautiously-decided. The ardent would advance to seize their object; the cautiously-decided would keep themselves from certain things. It is not to be thought that Confucius did not wish to get men pursuing the true medium, but being unable to assure himself of finding such, he therefore thought of the next class.'

'I venture to ask what sort of men they were who could be styled "The ambitious?"'

'Such,' replied Mencius, 'as Ch'in Chang, Tsang Hsî, and Mû P'ei, were those whom Confucius styled "ambitious."'

~ James Legge translation via nothingistic.org ~

 Go here to read the introductory post to this serialized version of the Works of Mencius.

Mencius - Book 7, Part 2, Chapter 36

Mencius said, 'Tsang Hsî was fond of sheep-dates, and his son, the philosopher Tsang, could not bear to eat sheep-dates.'

Kung-sun Ch'âu asked, saying, 'Which is best, minced meat and broiled meat, or sheep-dates?' Mencius said, 'Mince and broiled meat, to be sure.' Kung-sun Ch'âu went on, 'Then why did the philosopher Tsang eat mince and broiled meat, and would not eat sheep-dates?' Mencius answered, 'For mince and broiled meat there is a common liking, while that for sheep-dates was peculiar. We avoid the name, but do not avoid the surname. The surname is common; the name is peculiar.'

~ James Legge translation via nothingistic.org ~

 Go here to read the introductory post to this serialized version of the Works of Mencius.

Mencius - Book 7, Part 2, Chapter 35

Mencius said, 'To nourish the mind there is nothing better than to make the desires few. Here is a man whose desires are few: in some things he may not be able to keep his heart, but they will be few. Here is a man whose desires are many: in some things he may be able to keep his heart, but they will be few.'

~ James Legge translation via nothingistic.org ~

 Go here to read the introductory post to this serialized version of the Works of Mencius.

Mencius - Book 7, Part 2, Chapter 34

Mencius said, 'Those who give counsel to the great should despise them, and not look at their pomp and display.

'Halls several times eight cubits high, with beams projecting several cubits; these, if my wishes were to be realized, I would not have. Food spread before me over ten cubits square, and attendants and concubines to the amount of hundreds; these, though my wishes were realized, I would not have. Pleasure and wine, and the dash of hunting, with thousands of chariots following after me; these, though my wishes were realized, I would not have. What they esteem are what I would have nothing to do with; what I esteem are the rules of the ancients. Why should I stand in awe of them?'

~ James Legge translation via nothingistic.org ~

 Go here to read the introductory post to this serialized version of the Works of Mencius.

Mencius - Book 7, Part 2, Chapter 33

Mencius said, 'Yâo and Shun were what they were by nature; T'ang and Wû were so by returning to natural virtue.

'When all the movements, in the countenance and every turn of the body, are exactly what is proper, that shows the extreme degree of the complete virtue. Weeping for the dead should be from real sorrow, and not because of the living. The regular path of virtue is to be pursued without any bend, and from no view to emolument. The words should all be necessarily sincere, not with any desire to do what is right.

'The superior man performs the law of right, and thereby waits simply for what has been appointed.'

~ James Legge translation via nothingistic.org ~

 Go here to read the introductory post to this serialized version of the Works of Mencius.

Mencius - Book 7, Part 2, Chapter 32

Mencius said, 'Words which are simple, while their meaning is far-reaching, are good words. Principles which, as held, are compendious, while their application is extensive, are good principles. The words of the superior man do not go below the girdle, but great principles are contained in them.

'The principle which the superior man holds is that of personal cultivation, but the kingdom is thereby tranquillized.

'The disease of men is this: that they neglect their own fields, and go to weed the fields of others, and that what they require from others is great, while what they lay upon themselves is light.'

~ James Legge translation via nothingistic.org ~

 Go here to read the introductory post to this serialized version of the Works of Mencius.

Mencius - Book 7, Part 2, Chapter 31B

'If a man can give full development to the feeling which makes him shrink from injuring others, his benevolence will be more than can be called into practice. If he can give full development to the feeling which refuses to break through, or jump over, a wall, his righteousness will be more than can be called into practice.

'If he can give full development to the real feeling of dislike with which he receives the salutation, "Thou," "Thou," he will act righteously in all places and circumstances.

'When a scholar speaks what he ought not to speak, by guile of speech seeking to gain some end; and when he does not speak what he ought to speak, by guile of silence seeking to gain some end; both these cases are of a piece with breaking through a neighbor's wall.'

~ James Legge translation via nothingistic.org ~

 Go here to read the introductory post to this serialized version of the Works of Mencius.

Wrong Again! II

Scott Bradley

I have been incorrectly assuming that statements made by Zhuangzi originated with him and are thus expressions of his own point of view. But now Wu (The Butterfly as Companion) has suggested that these are quotes from sophists only given with a view to deconstructing them. I have taken what Zhuangzi offers only for the purpose of critiquing them, to be what he actually believed. But did he believe them or not? Yes. And no.

He adapts Hui Shih's "Love all things without exception, for heaven and earth are one body" and possibly (though no sophist) Mencius' "All things are complete in me" (Mencius 7A4) to read: "'Heaven and earth, with I-myself are born-at-the-same-time,' and 'Myriad things with I-myself make one'" (Wu).

Concerning the “oneness” of things, Zhuangzi immediately demonstrates that by positing oneness one necessarily destroys it: “Now-that they have already been 'made one', does the word still, indeed, obtain its existence? . . . The one with the word make two; two with the word make three" (Wu; italics mine) Oneness cannot be demonstrated because the act of doing so posits two; and once you've got two, you're soon back to myriad things. If oneness can be demonstrated by adding things up, then diversity can be demonstrated by dividing things out.

So does Zhuangzi believe in oneness? Yes. But we cannot make one that which already is one. "To labor one's mind trying to make things one," Zhuangzi tells us, is to be like monkeys who cannot see the overall numerical unity of chestnuts however distributed; three now and four later is ultimately no different from four now and three later.

Hui Shih thought he could demonstrate oneness logically (even if the logic was used to deconstruct itself), but in doing so he could not psychologically participate in the oneness that already is. Mencius thought that by being morally pure he could obtain that oneness, but by making Dao moral, that is discriminating, he destroyed every possibility of oneness and any participation in it. If there is oneness, it is already unconditionally so.

Zhuangzi agrees with the arguments of the sophists but turns them around on themselves. Demonstrate oneness and you void it. To try to logically or morally make things one renders the experience of oneness impossible. Take a step back, he suggests, shine a light on both sides of the coin (oneness and diversity) and accept them both as one coin, one reality. Affirm the one by embracing the many. Affirm the many by embracing the one. How does one express oneness? "Only follow-on the 'this-yes' of all" (Wu). Or, as Ziporyn has it, "Follow along with the rightness of the present 'this'." Or, as Zhouzi would put it, "All is well! Whatever is or happens is 'right' for you." Realize that not-one is also one and, therefore, oneness is already unconditionally true of you.

You can check out Scott's writings on Zhuangzi here.

Mencius - Book 7, Part 2, Chapter 31A

Mencius said, 'All men have some things which they cannot bear; extend that feeling to what they can bear, and benevolence will be the result. All men have some things which they will not do; extend that feeling to the things which they do, and righteousness will be the result.

~ James Legge translation via nothingistic.org ~

 Go here to read the introductory post to this serialized version of the Works of Mencius.

Wrong Again! I

Scott Bradley

Wrong again! Once again I discover that some of my pet verses in the Zhuangzi mean not what I thought they did. What's worse is that I have mounted the pulpit here in the Church of Zhuangzi and expounded expansively upon them. Alas, I cannot be trusted to faithfully deliver the Word. But you already knew that. Yes, but is it I alone who has failed or is it, god-forbid, that we must all necessarily fail to discover the definitive truth of Zhuangzi? Is the Zhuangzi so amorphous, so ambiguous, so obscure that we can never know for sure its intended meanings, or whether it has any? If it is, what can we depend on? We'd have to live lives cut adrift from all fixed moorings. We'd have to somehow reconcile ourselves to a world of fundamental not-knowing. Could we do it?

In his The Butterfly as Companion Wu offers his own, very literal translation of the first three chapters of the Zhuangzi and it is here that we discover the seemingly innocuous and admittedly interpretive parenthetic phrase: "(The sophist says)". Sophists are 'bad'. What does this sophist say? He says a series of paradoxical statements intended to break us free of our addiction to a narrow intellectualized ("logical") view of reality. A huge mountain is small. No on lives longer than a dead child. "'Heaven and earth, with I-myself are born-at-the-same-time,' and 'Myriad things with I-myself make one.'"

So, Zhuangzi didn't originate these, but only quoted them. The last, we knew, was at least an extension of a conclusion reached by Zhuangzi's friend, the sophist Hui Shih: "Love all things without exception, for heaven and earth are one body" (Chap. 33; Ziporyn). He demonstrated oneness by deconstructing the logic which separates them. It may even also be an adaptation of Mencius: "All things are complete in me" (Mencius 7A4). He matched the moral purity of his Dao. But does this mean that Zhuangzi did not agree with them? Or is it perhaps that he agreed with their conclusions, but not their presuppositions? Alas, as might be expected, the answer to both questions is both yes and no.

You can check out Scott's writings on Zhuangzi here.

Mencius - Book 7, Part 2, Chapter 30

When Mencius went to T'ang, he was lodged in the Upper palace. A sandal in the process of making had been placed there in a window, and when the keeper of the place came to look for it, he could not find it.

On this, some one asked Mencius, saying, 'Is it thus that your followers pilfer?' Mencius replied, 'Do you think that they came here to pilfer the sandal?' The man said, 'I apprehend not. But you, Master, having arranged to give lessons, do not go back to inquire into the past, and you do not reject those who come to you. If they come with the mind to learn, you receive them without any more ado.'

~ James Legge translation via nothingistic.org ~

 Go here to read the introductory post to this serialized version of the Works of Mencius.

Mencius - Book 7, Part 2, Chapter 29

Pan-ch'ang Kwo having obtained an official situation in Ch'î, Mencius said, 'He is a dead man, that Pan-ch'ang Kwo!' Pan-chang Kwo being put to death, the disciples asked, saying, 'How did you know, Master, that he would meet with death?' Mencius replied, 'He was a man, who had a little ability, but had not learned the great doctrines of the superior man. He was just qualified to bring death upon himself, but for nothing more.'

~ James Legge translation via nothingistic.org ~

 Go here to read the introductory post to this serialized version of the Works of Mencius.